Authors: Christina Dasom Tune and Yves Tiberghien, UBC
South Korea’s new President, Yoon Suk-yeol, has damaged from his predecessor’s cautious balancing of Seoul’s commerce relationship with China and safety alliance with america. South Korea joined the Quad Summit in Might 2022, signalling its want to hitch the Quadrilateral Safety Dialogue, and lately joined the US-led Indo-Pacific Financial Framework (IPEF).
This international coverage shift is because of hardening public opinion towards China since 2017. Nonetheless, South Korea’s commerce interdependence with China and the prices of aligning extra carefully with Washington and Japan will power Yoon to behave cautiously.
The roots of this deep public opinion shift return to China’s large financial and political retaliation towards South Korea’s 2017 deployment of the US’ THAAD missile defence system. Since this retaliation, public sentiment towards China fell from 56 per cent in 2016 to 34 per cent in 2018.
One other Might 2022 survey confirmed South Koreans turning extra to america and its allies: 58 per cent of South Koreans assist the deployment of THAAD, 83 per cent assist US-South Korea safety cooperation, 86 per cent assist becoming a member of the Quad and 83 per cent assist rising trilateral cooperation between South Korea, america and Japan. 70 per cent assist South Korea having a nuclear arms program. These numbers signify a historic shift in public opinion, although China’s subsequent strikes might nicely form future developments.
Home issues will probably overshadow South Korea’s international and safety coverage. President Yoon can’t sacrifice financial progress for the sake of safety realignment. An SBS 2022 survey confirmed that 42 per cent of the general public need Yoon to give attention to insurance policies that enhance financial progress, whereas solely 13 per cent wish to prioritise international and safety coverage.
Provide chain points can even hamper South Korea’s efforts to distance away from China, as these international locations’ economies are deeply intertwined. 2020 IMF information exhibits that 32 per cent of South Korea’s exports went to China (together with Hong Kong), in contrast with 15 per cent to america and 5 per cent to Japan. 24 per cent of imports got here from China, whereas solely 12 per cent got here from america and 10 per cent from Japan.
These ratios, unchanged since 2010, present how deeply intertwined the 2 economies are. A latest survey exhibits that South Korean teachers and enterprise consultants are conscious of this actuality and favour financial cooperation with China, although 51 per cent of South Koreans additionally assist US-led containment insurance policies towards China.
24 per cent of South Korea’s supplies and tools for its semiconductor trade come from China and these are exhausting to exchange. Any disruption to this commerce relationship would additionally depress the US economic system because it depends closely on these microchips.
The Yoon authorities doesn’t have a lot room to manoeuvre because the Nationwide Meeting, not due for one more election till 2024, is managed by a big opposition majority. Yoon’s margin of victory within the Might 2022 presidential election was very slender. The opposition helps a extra cautious method to international coverage — denouncing Yoon’s pivot to Washington as unpragmatic and ideological.
The Japanese response to South Korea’s newfound enthusiasm for cooperation has been cautious and can probably stay so for some time. Some see the rift between Japan and South Korea as a attainable sticking level that will stop South Korea from becoming a member of the Quad and hamper different multilateral ventures.
South Korea was not invited as a visitor on the G7 summit held in Germany in 2022 regardless of having been previously. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida additionally turned down a bilateral assembly with President Yoon on the sidelines of the NATO summit in June 2022.
Whereas Yoon reasserted his confidence throughout the summit that they may settle their disputes, Kishida has been extra circumspect. One constructive step did happen within the get up of Kishida’s resounding victory within the Higher Home election. On 19 July, South Korean Overseas Minister Park Jin had a uncommon assembly with Kishida throughout his three day go to to Japan. However Japan is not going to transfer additional except South Korea finds an answer to the bitter historic dispute about pressured labour throughout Japan’s lengthy occupation of the peninsula. Japan insists that any answer should be on the premise of the 1965 diplomatic settlement that resolved all historic issues.
There’s one additional constraint for Korea in its effort to push again towards China. China continues to carry some leverage over North Korea’s nuclear and army actions, because it stays one among North Korea’s few safety and financial companions.
Given such financial and geopolitical concerns, the Yoon authorities has rhetorically embraced current alliances with america and Japan with out but committing to a coherent and concrete international coverage to deepen these alliances. Seoul has enthusiastically joined the IPEF and attended the Quad summit in Tokyo. But, so far, it has not enacted any consequential insurance policies; nor has it resolved the battle between its commerce relationship with China and better strategic alignment with america.
The Yoon administration has made clear that it sees the IPEF as a framework for rule-setting in essential areas reminiscent of infrastructure and digital governance fairly than a software to diversify its commerce away from China. Though US Commerce Consultant Katherine Tai presents the IPEF as a commerce settlement akin to america–Mexico–Canada Settlement, Yoon doesn’t see it that means. Pursuing a safety coverage with excessive financial prices could be unpopular with the general public.
Yoon faces the identical problem his predecessor confronted — balancing the twin calls for of commerce relations with China and safety alignment with america. He can even be restricted by rising nationalism throughout the area and the following volatility in relations between states. Whereas Yoon has capitalised on anti-China sentiment inside South Korea, this may additionally exacerbate a tense regional surroundings. His shortly waning reputation amongst the citizens might constrain his international coverage agenda additional.
Christina Dasom Tune is a Grasp’s scholar in Political Science on the College of British Columbia.
Yves Tiberghien is Professor of Political Science and Konwakai Chair in Japanese Analysis on the College of British Columbia.
