Writer: Luke Lischin, College of Toronto
After six years of uncertainty beneath former Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte, the election of President Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr has been met with cautious optimism in Washington relating to the way forward for the US–Philippines alliance.
President Marcos extols the ‘particular relationship’ between america and the Philippines. He characterised discussions with Washington involving the Mutual Protection Treaty as a method of enhancing bilateral relations to satisfy new challenges. Marcos additionally expressed his intention to increase commerce and financial relations with america via initiatives together with the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Financial Framework.
However the pro-US rhetoric espoused by the Marcos administration is just not a dependable indicator of the President’s dedication to the alliance. Marcos could not share Duterte’s animus in the direction of america however his politics, home and international, carefully resemble his predecessor’s and bode simply as poorly for strengthening the alliance.
Simply as President Duterte sought to domesticate robust financial and political ties with China whereas searching for a compromise over the Philippines’ territorial claims within the South China Sea, Marcos is equally interesting to Beijing. Earlier than assuming workplace, Marcos described China–Philippines relations in comparable phrases to US–Philippines relations. He pledged that his administration would decide to what Duterte first termed as an ‘unbiased international coverage’.
Financial cooperation with China is a transparent precedence for Marcos, with the Philippines’ Division of Transportation set to start renegotiating US$4.9 billion value of mortgage agreements with China. The loans are for the development of railways as a part of the previous Duterte administration’s ‘Construct, Construct, Construct’ infrastructure program.
Whereas China is an apparent financial accomplice for the Philippines, the roots of Marcos’ imaginative and prescient for financial cooperation with China possible hint again to the years of Chinese language diplomatic outreach and funding in Ilocos Norte the place Marcos members of the family have served as governors since 1998. By means of funding within the residence province of the Marcos dynasty, China cultivated private relationships — with President Marcos, Senator Imee Marcos and her son Governor Matthew Manotoc, amongst others — that will likely be helpful for influencing the administration’s China coverage.
The political and private relationships between China and the Marcos household could have formed Ferdinand Marcos’ perspective on the Philippines’ territorial battle with China within the West Philippine Sea. Throughout his election marketing campaign, Marcos dismissed the significance of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration as a method of imposing Philippine sovereignty.
Marcos reversed his stance on 26 Could 2022 when he described the Philippines’ disputed maritime borders as ‘a proper’ relatively than a declare he would defend. Since that volte-face, each the Division of Nationwide Protection and the Division of Overseas Affairs have pledged to defend the Philippines’ sovereignty according to the President’s messaging.
But the Marcos administration seems prepared to sidestep problems with nationwide sovereignty with the intention to strengthen the Philippines’ financial relations with China. Working-level talks with China on joint oil and fuel developments within the West Philippine Sea have continued regardless of official negotiations terminating in June 2022.
The Marcos administration’s international coverage flexibility is usually defined as a hedging technique. It seeks to maximise the quantity of commerce, help and political assist the Philippines can obtain from China and america with out alienating both energy.
So long as the Marcos administration continues to hedge, it’s unlikely that america will be capable of persuade the Philippines to advance geopolitically delicate tasks which can be vital to the alliance. One such challenge is extending US entry to navy bases within the Philippines beneath the 2014 Enhanced Protection Cooperation Settlement.
Whereas america competes with China for diplomatic affect over Philippine international coverage, Washington faces a definite impediment in pushing its agenda regardless of the pro-US coverage preferences of the vast majority of Filipino residents. Not solely did Marcos safe a political mandate from the general public after his landslide victory within the polls, however his administration additionally enjoys supermajorities within the Home of Representatives and the Senate, the place the president’s allies and kin occupy key posts.
The Marcos administration additionally actively manages dissenting public opinion and political opposition via a large disinformation marketing campaign, concentrating on left-wing political teams and activists whereas utilizing lawfare to censor vital media shops.
These circumstances first posed main obstacles for the US–Philippines alliance beneath the Duterte administration. They enabled Duterte to pursue a closely personalised international coverage agenda that drew the Philippines nearer to China whereas extorting america to protect even probably the most fundamental parts of the alliance.
After positioning himself because the rightful successor to the earlier administration, Marcos has inherited the Duterte administration’s political equipment. That may make it tough for america to affect the Philippines’ international coverage via government, legislative and public diplomatic efforts.
Underneath these circumstances, america could also be spared the persistent threats to alliance establishments that it confronted beneath the Duterte administration. However with out the diplomatic means to incentivise President Marcos to cut back the Philippines’ international coverage hedging, expectations for future discussions regarding the Mutual Protection Treaty and different alliance agreements will yield modest and certain disappointing outcomes for america.
Luke Lischin is a PhD pupil within the Political Science Division on the College of Toronto and an unbiased advisor on political violence in Southeast Asia.
